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DEJA VU AND 8(A)(2): WHATS REALLY
BEING CHILLED BY ELECTROMATION?
Charles J. Morrist

INTRODUCTION
The fame of Electromation'relates more to its hype than to
its type. The case was not a bona fide worker participation
case, and it established no new legal principles. In deciding
Electromation, a unanimous National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") held that joint employee/management committees
(dubbed "Action Committees") that addressed certain statutory
bargaining subjects were "labor organizations" within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (the "Act").2
Hence, management's creation and domination of those committees was an unfair labor practice. This holding was based on
unambiguous language in the Act3 and on an unbroken chain of
long-established precedent.4
Why has this case aroused such furor? Although the committees in Electromation did not constitute labor unions in the
conventional sense, they were not unique. As one knowledgeable observer noted, "[a] considerable number of organizations
in the U.S. have employee committees not so dissimilar to
Electromations."5 This is ddj& vu, because such joint commit-

t Professor Emeritus of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
' Electromation, Inc. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enfd, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir.
1994). This essay focuses on the National Labor Relations Board's decision in
Electromation and does not discuss the Seventh Circuit's recent enforcement
of the case.
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).
3Id. §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2).
' In its very first case the NLRB found that by dominating and interfering
with a labor organization and by contributing financial support to that organization, the employer engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning
of § 8(a)(2). Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 1 N.L.R.B. 1, 5 (1935); see also
Armco, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 350 (1984); Fire Alert Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 133 (1970);
Garment Workers v. N.L.R.B. (Bernhard-Altman Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731
(1961); N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959); N.L.R.B. v.
Newport News Shipping Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
' Barbara P. Noble, Teamwork Concept Faces Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
2, 1993, at A38 (quoting Arnold Perl, the attorney representing the United
States Chamber of Commerce, an amicus in Electromation).
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tees were common when the Act was passed in 1935.6
Electromation was an extraordinary decision only because the
Board serendipitously decided to use the occasion to explore the
legal ramifications of employee participation plans ("EPPs"),
even though the Action Committees in the case did not remotely
resemble such plans.
As generally understood, EPPs embrace active employee
involvement in decision-making in the work or production
process, but the committees in Electromation were not so involved. However, when the NLRB targeted the case for oral
argument, some observers in the management community
worried that the Board's decision might impinge adversely on
legitimate employer efforts to involve employees in work-process
decisions.' Other management observers apparently were concerned more that the case might affect a broader area of employee participation; they feared the Board's decision would
implicate current practices in many nonunion workplaces in
which employees deal with their employers in setting conditions
of employment and settling grievances in ways that could
qualify those practices as labor organizations within the meaning of section 2(5).8
By the time the Board issued its decision, "Electromation!"
was the new battle cry of the nonunion management community. The main message was that Electromation had a "chilling
effect" on worker participation and something should be done
about it. 9 Their solution pointed toward congressional repeal of
the Act's sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2).' 0

6 E. E. CUMMINS, THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES

562-63, 565-

66 (1932); CARROLL R. DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERIcAN INDUSTRY
637, 640 (2d ed. 1948); HARRY A. MILLIS & ROYAL E. MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR 841, 857-59 (1945).
7

See, e.g., HearingsBefore the Comm'n on the Future of Worker-Management Relations [hereinafter Hearings], at 2 (Jan. 19, 1994) (statement of
Daniel V. Yager, Assistant General Counsel, Labor Policy Association,
appearing on behalf of a "Working Group" of management labor attorneys).
8 A "labor organization" is "any organization of any kind, or any agency or
employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work." 42 U.S.C. § 152(5).
9

Hearings, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Daniel J. Yager).

1 See S. 669, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993); H.R. 1529, 103d Cong., 1st.

Sess. (1993). The only employer-dominated labor organizations that hence-
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Electromation exposed the Achilles' heel of nonunion
management's approach to the Nation Labor Relations Act:
section 8(a)(2). Until Electromation,section 8(a)(2) was the best
kept secret in American labor law. This case thus highlighted
a heretofore apparently innocuous provision of the Act. In
recent years section 8(a)(2) was enforced only rarely, because
enforcement was attempted only when a conventional labor
union tried to organize."1 If this provision becomes widely and
effectively enforced, which seems likely, it will have a substantial impact on the way many nonunion companies organize and
arrange employee-involvement in determining working conditions and handling grievances. Although legitimate worker
participation plans will not be affected, many plans and committees currently operating in violation of section 8(a)(2) will be
affected - plans that previously operated in a relatively safe
haven. This is where Electromationwill have its chilling effect.
I. TWO CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYEE COMMITTEES
Opponents of the NLRB's decision in Electromation fail to
distinguish between two distinct categories of employee committees. This distinction is critical. In the first category are EPPs
in which employees engage in day-to-day decision-making or
communications concerning the work with which they are
involved. The Board's General Foods' and Sears, Roebuck"
decisions established that such committees in a nonunion
setting are not labor organizations under section 2(5). Hence,
employee involvement in the work or production process whereby managerial functions regarding work methods are delegated

forth would be outlawed under these substantially identical bills would be
those that identify the product of their discussions or dealings with the
employer as a "collective bargaining agreement."
" See Charles J. Morris, A Blueprint for Reform of the National Labor
Relations Act, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 517, 537 n.83 (1994) (showing that all
published NLRB cases prior to Electromation charging § 8(a)(2) violations

were filed ancillary to union organizing campaigns).
'

General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977) (holding that team-type

programs involving employees in the productions process are not prohibited by
§ 8(a)(2)).
"3Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985) (holding that a communications committee that is not an advocate for employees, but a tool to increase
efficiency is not a "labor organization" prohibited by § 8(a)(2)).

28
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to employees, such as in employee production teams, 4 and
communication committees that confine their discussions to
matters related to work performance" are clearly lawful.
In the second category are committees through which
employees deal with their employer on issues "concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."' 6 Because committees of this
latter type in a nonunion setting clearly are unlawful, their
chilling should not be deemed objectionable in a law-abiding
society. The only way such committees might affect productivity
is by their palliative effect on employees who might otherwise
prefer an independent collective voice to represent them in
negotiating their working conditions. This second category of
committee is the epitome of the sham labor organizations
section 8(a)(2) was intended to prohibit.
With respect to Electromation'sinfluence on participatory
employee committees of the first category, I have seen no
evidence of a chilling effect, and available reports point in the
opposite direction. For example, former NLRB chairman and
distinguished management attorney Edward B. Miller noted
that the
"so-called 'Electromation problem" simply is a
"myth."'1 7 He said that it is indeed possible to have "effective"
employee participation programs "in both union and non-union
companies without the necessity of any change in current
law."'" Miller foresaw the danger inherent in tampering with
the present law when he candidly asserted, "While I represent
management, I do not kid myself. If section 8(a)(2) were to be
repealed, I have no doubt that in not too many months or years
sham company unions would again recur."'9
Companies certainly are not scuttling their legitimate EPPs.
Jerome Rosow, president of the Work in America Institute, a
non-profit group that promotes employee participation, observed
that although "[s]ome companies are going to have to clean up
their act ...most will find ways to work within the labor

14

See, e.g., General Foods, supra note 12.

15 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck, supra note 13.
16 29

U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).

1 See FormerNLRB ChairmanMiller Calls Electromation Problem 'Myth,'

DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 105, at A-5 (Oct. 20, 1993).
18

Id.

19Id.
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laws. ' 2 "Clean up their act," however, is what many nonunion
advocates apparently do not want to hear.
The chilling effect of Electromation is thus to be found on
the illegal programs of the second category, not on the legitimate nonunion EPPs of the second category. However, because
many affected nonunion companies will resist giving up their
tainted worker-involvement programs, Electromation has become a convenient whipping boy that masks the true concern
about section 8(a)(2) - that it might finally be enforced as Congress intended.
H. THE POST-ELECTROMATION CLEAN-UP
PROCESS & THE POLAROID EXPERIENCE
The clean-up process, nevertheless, is beginning. Sometimes it is discharged in good faith; sometimes not. As an
illustration of the good faith approach, one prominent management attorney confirmed to me that as a direct result of
Electromationhe now advises his clients, including some billiondollar companies, that many of their existing employee-involvement programs are illegal. Although he did not wish to be the
bearer of bad news, he felt his only ethical option was to so
advise his clients.2 '
However, some human resources managers, apparently
unconstrained by a code of professional responsibility, might
advise their companies to continue their tainted employeeinvolvement programs, even though such programs are known
now to be illegal, on the theory that nothing need be changed
before it is formally challenged. Unfortunately, this approach
may well represent the conventional wisdom that prevails
among industrial relations management in many United States
companies. That attitude eventually may change, however,
because the signs are increasing that section 8(a)(2) will be
enforced more vigorously and with greater frequency.
Some of those signs are coming from the rumblings that
followed Polaroid Corporation's well-publicized cancellation of
its long-established Employees' Committee ("EC"). 22 Polaroid
Montague, Labor Board: Du Pont Must Kill Committees, USA
ToDAY, June 8, 1993, at 6B.
21 This conversation took place at the 1994 Spring Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association in Philadelphia with reference to programs
falling in the second category.
' See Polaroid Dissolves Employee Committee in Response to Labor
20Bill
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promptly filled that void by creating several successor entities,
also of questioned legality." The publicly known facts about
the EC and other employee structures at Polaroid suggest that
this company may have violated the law for many years.24
The events at Polaroid are especially significant for two
reasons. First, they illustrate an apparent bad faith clean-up
process. The corporation's new employee structures, consisting
of an "Employee-Owners' Influence Council" and a group of
"employee advocates," appear to be mere subterfuges that,
as
the NLRB complaint alleges, are but further examples of employer-dominated labor organizations within the meaning of
sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2). Second, the resulting exposure of
Polaroid's "employer advocates" will provide the first legal test
in recent years of an "ombudsman" plan.2 5 Such grievance
plans are increasingly popular among many nonunion companies.
I shall not dwell on the specifics of Polaroid's defunct
Employees' Committee, for it was an unexceptionable example
of a very ordinary company union, distinguished only by its
longevity." Nor shall I discuss all of the general features of
its replacement plan, the "Employee-Owners' Influence Council,"
because that entity appears to replicate the employee representation of the old Employees' Committee, only with the addition
of a mantra-like disavowal of representational intent.2 7 ClearDepartment Ruling, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 121, at A-3 (June 23, 1992)
[hereinafter PolaroidDissolves] (discussing the dissolution of Polaroid's EC);
see also DAVID W. EWING, JUSTICE ON THE JOB: RESOLVING GRIEVANCES IN

THE NONUNION WORKPLACE 299 (1988).
' See Testimony on Employee Committees Highlights Dunlop Commission
Hearing, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 4, at A-11 (Jan. 6, 1994) [hereinafter
Employee Committees] (noting that the legality of Polaroid's successor entities
has also been challenged).
24 See PolaroidDissolves, supra note 22, at A-3, in which Ann Leibowitz,
Polaroid's labor counsel, explained that the corporation's EC was created
around 1949 and "evolved as a Polaroid institution quite without regard to the
laws that regulate labor organizations."
' See Amended Consolidated Complaint, Polaroid Corp., Nos. 1-CA-29966,
1-CA-30063, 1-CA-30211 (NLRB 1st Region Sept. 15, 1994).
26
See Employee Committees, supra note 23, at A-4 (noting that Polaroid's
Employees' Committee was created in 1949).
2 Even the name "Influence Council" conveys the concept of representation
in that it was intended to provide a means for employees to influence top
management regarding "matters of pay, benefits, policy and practices," each
clearly a mandatory bargaining subject. Amended Consolidated Complaint,

1994]
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ly worth noting, however, is Polaroid's ombudsman' plan,
called "employee advocates. ''9 Such a plan has not been the
subject of any recent NLRB case prior to Polaroid. This ombudsman plan was long a feature of Polaroid's grievance procedure 0 and is fairly typical of the questionable3 1 ombudsman
systems found in many United States companies.
Nonunion ombudsman plans generally provide employees
with a counselor to represent them as they move through the
company's grievance procedure. Various names are applied to
the person assuming this representational role including "ombudsman," "ombudsperson," "employee representative," "employee counselor," and "employee specialist." Whatever the nomenclature, this person serves as the grievant's agent, representing
and dealing with management on the employee's behalf. This
assistance may be provided regardless of whether the company
has a defined grievance procedure. 2
Given the role played by the ombudsman, such a person is
"an agency" within the meaning of the Act's section 2(5)." 3
Contrary to popular belief, under section 2(5) a "labor organization" is not necessarily a collective entity; a single person may
constitute a labor organization.' In N.L.R.B. v. GeneralPreci-

supra note 23, at 3-4.
' I shall use the familiar Swedish term "ombudsman," which refers in this
essay to either a female or a male representative.
Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 23, at 3.
30
See, e.g., EWING, supra note 21, at 299-308 (describing Polaroid's
ombudsman program).
" Id. at 161-69 (describing the National Broadcasting Company's program);
id. at 205-21 (describing Donely Corporation's program); id. at 241-51 (describing the program at General Electric's Range Plant in Columbia, Md.); id. at
281-97 (describing Northrup Corporation's program).
12 See generally William L. Kandel & Sheri L. Fumer, The Corporate
Ombudsman and Employment Law: Maintaining the Confidentiality of
Communications, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 587 (1994). "An ombudsman is a
neutral member of the corporation who provides confidential and informal
assistance to employees in resolving work-related concerns ....

The ombuds-

man has been fulfilling its [sic] role admirably in numerous large corporations." Id. at 587. "Corporate ombudsmen tend to be regular employees ....
Most are full-time ombudsmen, while some perform other corporate functions."
Id. at 591.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
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sion, Inc., 5 the Third Circuit upheld the Board's finding that
an employee counselor plan through which employees were
offered the assistance of counselors hired by the employer
violated section 8(a)(2)."6 The court found this ombudsman
plan to be a successor to the previously disestablished
employees' committee and held it immaterial that the counselors were "acting as clearly identified management personnel.""7
The scheme of the Act requires that an employee's representative be independent of the employer.3" The typical ombudsman
is not.

CONCLUSION
The foregoing are the primary reasons the nonunion management community worries about the prospects for section
8(a)(2) enforcement in the post-Electromation era. Regarding
the desire of most United States companies to remain nonunion,
1995 is not significantly different from 1935. It certainly is not
different with regard to one of the principal means many employers utilize to maintain a union-free workplace:

employee

participation plans that violate the Act. It indeed is evident
what's really being chilled by Electromation.

8 381 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1967).
36 The court noted that the employee counselors assisted, counseled, and
represented large numbers of employees in the processing and presentation of
grievances. Id. at 62.
" Id. at 64. According to the court, the labeling of the counselors as
"management personnel" did not offset their avowed purpose of dealing with
management on behalf of the employees. Id. The court noted that the
employer dominated the sole organization available to its employees with
respect to their entire relationship to their employer, including the handling
of their grievances. In so doing, the employer "is affirmatively going against
the letter and spirit of the [National Labor Relations] Act." Id. at 149.
38
Id.at 149. As Senator Wagner noted with reference to the portion of the
Wagner Act here in issue, "Nor can a man whose very livelihood depends upon
maintaining the favor of his employer, be outspoken and independent in
representing the interest of employees." Hearings on S. 1958 Before the
Senate Comm. on Educationand Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reprinted
in 1 NLRB, LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,
1935, at 1416 (1949).

